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 The 1857 Rebellion against the East India Company and the subsequent establishment of 
the British Raj had profound implications on colonial policy. It was in this milieu wherein the 
Raj began to classify Muslims as naturally irrational and fanatic as well as wholly responsible for 
the Rebellion. At the same time, the state began a push for Muslim education, and the colonial 
archive demonstrates a desire by the state for Muslims to enter the government-aided educational 
apparatus. 
 This thesis examines the development of Muslim education in North India following the 
1857 Rebellion until the publication of the Indian Education Commission of 1882. The question 
asked is two-fold: (1) why did the colonial state begin a push for education in Muslim 
communities during this era? (2) What were the ramifications of this policy on Muslim identity?  
To answer the first question requires an examination of correspondence within the 
Education Department, which reveals an intersection between colonial ethnography, social 
classification, and a post-1857 policing of the Muslim community. The second question allows 
one to trace the emergence of a group identity that has persisted to the present: that of the 
uneducated Muslim. However, it is the contention of this thesis that this identity was not simply 
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 All quotes taken from documents retain their original transliteration (ex: Oudh or 
Moulvie) as well as archaic usages (Mahomedan). However, all usage outside of these excerpts 
utilize commonly accepted standardized spellings (ex: Awadh, Maulvi, or Muslim) only when 
indirectly referencing the versions used within documents. References to titles and names of 
organizations will retain their original usage (ex: The Select Committee for the Betterment and 
Advancement of Mahomedan Education). Plurals are formed by adding an s to the loan-word 
(ex: maulvis).  
 When transliterating from Urdu, the following conventions are applied. Consonants with 
an English equivalent are left as such (ex: b for be, s for sīn, k for kāf, w/v for v’āo). No 
differentiation is noted between multiple consonants with a single English equivalent: se, sīn, 
and su’ād are all transliterated as s; te and to’e as t; ze, zhe, zu’ād, and z’oe as z. Aspiration is 
indicated by an h after a consonant. Retroflex letters are represented by an underline (ex: d for 
dāl, t for te). The letters ‘ain and ghain are transliterated as „ and ġ, respectively. As per vowels, 
alif is written as a, i, or u; alif madda as ā; vā’o as o or ū; ye as ī; and barī ye as ē or ai. The 





  MAOC – Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College 
 
  NAI – National Archives of India 
 
  NWP – North Western Provinces and Awadh 
 








Table 1.1: Proportion of Hindus and Muslims attending Government Schools…………………31
            
 
 
Table 1.2: Government Officers in Schools in 1870-71…………………………………………35
      
 
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Hindu/Muslim Attendance in Colonial Schools  











Muslim Education and its Discontents 
 
Following the completion of the 1857 Rebellion against the East India Company and the 
establishment of the British Raj, Henry Harington Thomas wrote and published a small 
pamphlet. Titled, “The Late Rebellion in India and Our Future Policy,” the pamphlet attempted 
to define methods of rule within the newly created British Raj – a lofty proposition from a 
former bureaucrat of the East India Company. Born in 1795, Thomas joined the Bengal Civil 
Service in 1813 after graduating with honors from Fort William College in Persian and 
Hindustani languages.
1
 He worked in the Civil Service from 1813 to 1847 and served his final 
post as a judge in Lahore.
2
 After leaving the Bengal Civil Service, he retired to his native city of 
Bath and became a member of both the Royal Asiatic Society and the Oriental Club, before 
dying in 1879.
3
 While it cannot be assumed that Thomas is wholly representative of the views of 
the post-1857 British bourgeois, his life experiences make him an example of an historical vox 
populi of the colonially imbricated bourgeoisie.  
 Like many British citizens in the metropole, Thomas felt a deep sense of hostility towards 
the subcontinent immediately following the rebellion. In this milieu, many called for violent 
retaliation; for example, the image below was published in a September 1857 issue of Punch. 
Titled “Justice,” it portrayed a white, female Britannia, flanked by white soldiers from the 
Bengal Army violently enacting revenge against darker-skinned soldiers (the rebels of 1857), 
while frightened Indian women and children watched: 
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Figure 1: “Justice,” Punch, September 12, 1857, 108. 
However, Thomas posited that the British should instead enact a different revenge: a 
reformulation of the syllabi of Indian schools. Based on his purported interactions with the native 
population of the North-Western Provinces, Thomas exhorted that “the general introduction of 
our own language seems, to my view, the most certain way to bring the natives nearer to the 
Government,” going as far as to conclude that, “let them speak and understand English, and they 
will begin to think in English, and to have English aspirations.” He succinctly summarized his 
rationale behind English education when he asserted that a “growing familiarity with our 
language and their acquirement of our literature, would render their relapse into barbarism 
impossible.”
4
 Thus, the proper response to the rebellion would have been to institute an 
educational system that would not simply serve as a form of punishment, but instead change the 
way the colonized were to think about the world around them. The idea to use schooling as a tool 
for socialization should come as to no surprise: the mid-19
th
 century saw a shift in the opinion of 
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 Henry Harington Thomas, The Late Rebellion in India, and Our Future Policy (London: W. Kent & Co., 1858), 
22, 24.  
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public schooling in Britain: schools were seen as locales where working-class children could be 
both morally and educationally trained in working-class knowledge patterns as approved by 
many bourgeois reformers. Placing children in these schools eventually benefited a bourgeois 
hegemony.
5
 Although there is no reason to believe that British authorities either in London or 
India had heeded Henry Harington Thomas' admonitions, it remains so that over the course of the 
next twenty-five years, his policies would be considered, debated, reformulated, and 
implemented within the Raj.  
 To understand how Thomas transformed from Civil Service bureaucrat to prophet, 1857 
must be understood as a watershed moment. Though most literature on 1857 mentions the 
profound change in colonial policy following the rebellion, it is worth repeating a few key 
points. As the British began to examine who were the primary perpetrators of the 1857 
Rebellion, many began to point to the Muslim population as chiefly responsible. This conclusion 
was reached despite the fact that many of the well-known rebellion leaders were Hindu 
(including the Rānī of Jhansī, Tatyā Tope, and Nānā Sahib) and that it would have been more 
accurate to posit the rebellion as a Hindustani rather than communal uprising. Nevertheless, the 
idea that Muslims voiced their discontent through the name of Bahādur Shāh Zafar and were 
solely responsible for the rebellion remained pervasive. 
 For example, following the conclusion of the rebellion, Prime Minister Palmerston wrote 
to the Viceroy Lord Canning that all buildings connected to Muslim tradition should be leveled 
to the ground “without regard to antiquarian veneration or artistic predilection.”
6
 Canning, in 
reference to Palmerston's letter wrote, “I am quite opposed to touching the Jumna [sic] Masjid. . . 
the Hindoo religion has done this as well as the Mahomedan; and a crusade against one must be a 
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crusade against the other.”
7
 While Viceroy Canning insisted upon an even hand in the response to 
the rebellion, he could not stem the tide of belief that the Muslims were solely responsible for the 
rebellion.  
Fury against the Muslim population was seen in the metropole as well. In the previously 
mentioned pamphlet, Thomas wrote that the rebellion was “a result of a Mahomedan 
conspiracy.”
8
 Individual citizens began to petition the government to act against the Muslim 
population as well. For example, James J. Macintyre, a middling historian and member of the 
English gentry, pleaded to both the Palmerston and Derby cabinets to enact revenge by invading 
Mecca “for the peace and benefit of Christendom.” He made it clear that the present was “the fit 
time for seizing and leveling to the ground the temple and Caaba [sic] of Mecca, and carrying 
away as trophies the sacred black and white stones.” Both cabinets politely replied back 
indicating that they would not follow through on his advice.
9 
 This is not to say that Muslim participation in 1857 did not exist. Peter Hardy noted that 
members of the religious classes were prominent members, events in the countryside seemed to 
point to a particular Muslim character, and of course, the presence of Bahādur Shāh Zafar as the 
re-instated de jure leader of India cannot be ignored.
10
 Thomas Metcalf has pointed out that in 
localities such as Rohilkhand, there existed distinct, cohesive, and organized Muslim aristocracy; 
the rebellion would seem to be a Muslim effort in such areas.
11
  
 Despite contentions in understanding which religious group was responsible for the 1857 
Rebellion, what one cannot take contention with was the fundamental shift of British in the view 
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of the native Indian. As Metcalf makes clear, the post-1857 milieu brought about the 
popularization of the martial race theory. No longer was everyone to be deemed equal; instead, 
“races” within India were subjugated to a militarized hierarchy which ranged from the docile 
Bengali “babu” to the martial Gurkha. The military too, began to change – there began a greater 
emphasis in recruiting from the metropole, rather than the colony.
12
 According to many 
historians, this represented the dawn of a conservative movement: the civilizing mission had 
failed. India was not and could not be enlightened – it was to be ruled by force.  
The Colonial Archive 
This thesis will argue that the sentiment stated above – that Muslims were chiefly 
responsible for the 1857 rebellion – translated itself not into a laissez-faire conservative form of 
rule, but rather a colonial governance predicated upon ethnography and social classification. 
Beginning in 1858, educational records in the Home Department archives of the British Raj 
stress a need for the deployment of Muslim education. This call for education is a constant 
feature of official Home Department correspondence such as education reports, letters between 
administrators, and letters from and between the Muslim elite. In the latter case, figures such as 
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan picked up the mantle for education in the process of establishing the 
Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875. This sentiment reached an apogee in 
1882 with the publication of the Report of the Indian Education Commission. This report, which 
contained 600 folios and 222 resolutions, dedicated a significant portion to the question of 
Muslim education and represented a state meditation upon the question of Muslim education and 
socialization in the British Raj.  
The Argument 
This thesis will consider the development of Muslim education in India from the 
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conclusion of the 1857 Rebellion and the establishment of the British Raj to the publication of 
the Indian Education Commission of 1882. What is seen in this period was a rising number of 
meditations on Muslim education within the colonial archive. The question asked within the 
scope of this thesis is two-fold: (1) why did the colonial state begin a push for education in 
Muslim communities during this era? (2) What were the ramifications of this policy on the 
development of Muslim identity?
13
 These questions form the basis for each chapter.  
Chapter One asks why the colonial state focused so intently on Muslim education. After a 
brief discussion on the development of the educational apparatus, the department‟s notion of 
“perfect religious neutrality” as delineated in 1858 is examined. Paradoxically, this policy as an 
ideology allowed the colonial state to divorce an ethnographic classification from a religious 
practice, making it possible to intervene within an ethno-religious identity. This ethnographic 
consideration acts as a segue into an analysis of educational reports and letters of the Education 
Department. The rationale behind Muslim education can be located within the lurking presence 
of the trauma of the 1857 Rebellion; however, this motivation for Muslim education is not 
readily apparent upon an initial reading. Rather, it must be located as embedded in the deep 
structure and language of the colonial state. It should be noted that the usage of the school to act 
as a site of resocialization is in line with a 19
th
 century project by nation-states to create 
“citizens” within the confines of government-aided schools. For example, Eugen Weber explored 
how the French state used centralized and national syllabi (containing a national and patriotic 
pedagogy that utilized civil and moral indoctrination) in government-aided public schools to 
socialize the peasant population of 19
th
 century France into bona fide Frenchmen.
14
  Thus, this 
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chapter will not simply present archival material, but instead examine the structure of these 
sources to locate the colonial state‟s desire to socialize the Muslim population.  
Chapter Two considers the implications of the colonial push for Muslim education –
namely the formation of the persistent identity of the “uneducated Muslim.” Beginning with an 
exercise in taking colonial ethnographic data at “face-value” and determining that Muslims 
attended colonial schools in similar proportions to other ethno-religious groups, this chapter 
seeks to understand why this trope developed in the Muslim community in lieu of any other. 
However, the state was not the only actor involved in the formation of identities. During this 
epoch, the Muslim elite were instrumental in putting forth an idea of the uneducated Muslim. In 
particular, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan‟s goal of bringing forth an Islamic modernization was instead 
predicated upon what Antonio Gramsci and Partha Chatterjee termed the “passive revolution.” In 
this nexus of state and Muslim, the non-elite Muslim student-subject found himself being placed 
in a moment of subalternity under a dominant discourse.  
 The identity of the uneducated Muslim has been a persistent trope within the scope of 
colonial and post-colonial South Asia. For example, the Indian news journal Economic and 
Political Weekly opened a 2001 article on education by invoking a common stereotype: “it is 
generally thought that Muslims do not prefer to send their children especially girl children to 
school. They are more concerned about religious education and therefore are inclined to open 
more and more madrasas.”
15
 Though the article attempted to dispel this notion, it noted the 
pervasiveness of this stereotype – leading one to believe that the cultural capital of this trope 
remains in circulation. More recently in 2006, the Indian government released the Sachar Report, 
which was commissioned to consider the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim 
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 It too concluded that it is a commonly held belief that Muslims in India 
tend to dissuade their children from attending government-aided schools. Indeed, the assumption 
that Muslims are uneducated is alive and thriving. This thesis intends to trace this assumption 
back to the point where it began: the annals of governance following the Rebellion. 
Educational Historiography: A Brief Review 
 It remains a difficult task to locate the creation of an identity within the purview of 
education during the Raj. A curious and palpable gap in the historiography of South Asia is the 
study of education and its studentry. This is not to say that major studies are not widely available; 
however, these works are often exemplified by two variant streams of historiography. On one 
hand, one sees a large number of longue durée approaches.
17
 On the other hand, many studies 
deploy a historiography that utilizes the educational archive by examining it in contexts of elite 
circles. A problem with both approaches is that they often leave a visible gap: an evaluation of 
how institutions of education developed around the Muslim community. This historiographical 
review will attempt to locate and problematize the presence – however brief – of the Muslim 
student within South Asian educational historiography.  
 Following independence, the state of educational historiography largely hinged upon 
comprehensive histories written by authors who contemplated the gravity of the imposition of 
English education in creating the socio-cultural landscape of post-colonial India.
18
 Here, the term 
“comprehensive history” refers to the nature of these texts: they often consider the totality of 
Indian education through a longue durée approach. These studies usually involve a discussion of 
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education in India during the ancient, medieval, and modern eras, or some combination thereof. 
What characterizes these texts is a reliance on commissions and reports created during the Raj; 
their dependence on these sources often binds them to the colonialist discourse found in the 
archive.  
 Henceforth, one notices two aspects of these texts: firstly, they are descriptive in scope, 
consisting of a collection of summaries of the various commissions conducted throughout the 
history of colonial India. Secondly, because these histories simply regurgitate these narratives, 
they often lack any information about the students themselves, let alone the Muslim student. It 
cannot be emphasized enough that this is not simply a case of the subaltern being unable to speak 
due to the marginalization or attempted erasure of their voice in the colonial archive. Instead, an 
entire historical student body remains missing or marginalized from an extensive corpus of 
historical texts. Indeed, when texts on South Asian education mention the Muslim student-
subject, his or her presence is often relegated to a comment on a lack of Muslim education and 
the fact that the colonial state wished to propagate education within this community. This thesis 
represents an attempt to locate a student body that has often been relegated to a periphery and 
tease out the relationship between the colonial state and the Muslim student. In the current state 
of educational historiography, is it possible to understand whether the non-elite Muslim subject 
attended government-aided schools and why the colonial state wished for these Muslims to 
attend the Raj‟s schools? 
For example, Suresh C. Ghosh's The History of Education in India can be seen as a 
prototypical example of a comprehensive history in that it attempts to put forth an history of 
Indian education from the establishment of the Indus Valley Civilization (c. 3000 B.C.) to the 
present (c. 1997). Ghosh‟s work on the history of educational institutions in South Asia is an 
10 
 
example of the previously mentioned longue durée approach towards historiography. In 
documenting 5000 years of educational history, he attempts to track a long-term change in 
educational standards by comparing educational institutions during varying periods of rule. 
However, because a longue durée history requires an analysis of an extended period of time, the 
presence of Muslims within his section on colonial education is limited to the Indian Education 
Commission of 1882, as it represented the largest state meditation on the status of Muslim 
education. His summary of the Hunter Commission states that it recommended the 
“encouragement of indigenous Muslim schools like the establishment of Muslim High, Middle 
and Primary Schools and normal schools as well as institution of scholarship and studentship 
from primary to college level.”
19
 One is left with the understanding that education for Muslims 
was encouraged (an aspect of state policy already evident from the Hunter Commission), but 
with no idea whether these schools were built or whether anyone attended them at all.   
 There are texts, however, that contend much better with re-centering of the student-
subject in discussions on education. Aparna Basu's Essays in the History of Indian Education sets 
the stage for a student-centric intervention in the study of history. For example, she poses a 
question that has been heretofore ignored: “why did Indians go to the new schools and 
colleges?”
20
 As has been demonstrated, this simple question was ignored in much of the 
descriptive longue durée historiography that has constituted a significant portion of the South 
Asian educational corpus. While her answer, “primarily for economic self-betterment,”
21
 is 
located in economic materialism, this text remains one of the few examples of a comprehensive 
analysis of colonial education that refrains from recapitulating a descriptive history. Furthermore, 
Basu attempts to locate the Muslim subject when she contends that, “where Muslims were more 
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urbanized and pursued non-agricultural occupations they were educationally more advanced than 
the Muslims of East Bengal and West Punjab who were poor peasants.”
22
 Her brief conclusion 
represents the first attempt to access the space of the Muslim student-subject by highlighting the 
geographic and class-based divisions of education. However, why did this split occur? 
Unfortunately, Basu does not discuss the structures located behind this division. Was this 
disparity a question of access (more sites for educational opportunity within the cities) or was it 
purely economic (the economic transience of the peasantry prevented children from dedicating 
time away from material work)? Basu neglects these important questions, instead opting for her 
text to set the stage for later historians to make an incursion into Indian education.  
 In actuality, Peter Hardy's The Muslims of British India attempted to answer these 
questions ten years prior to the publication of Basu's work. According to Hardy, it was the 
“perennial threat of drought, flood, scarcity, and how to meet the demands of the tax-gatherer 
and moneylender” that prevented the rural poor from attending English schools.
23
 However, this 
single sentence represents one of the few attempts at accessing a history of the mass population 
of Muslims attending government-aided schools – again, an example of the insufficiency of 
educational historiography. Additionally, the focus of the argument on economic materialism 
ultimately explains little about the peasantry. In spite of materialist analyses saying otherwise, 
the Muslim masses (including subalterns) have had access to various socio-cultural institutions 
that would seem to be beyond their reach.
24
 Furthermore, Hardy eschews a meditation on the 
vast majority of Muslim subjects and instead moves on to disparities in higher education (often 
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seen as the realm of the elites). While he attempts to make gestures as to why most Muslim 
subjects did not pursue higher education, he eventually concludes that one should instead make 
an incursion into the study of the urban middle-class and their entry into tertiary schooling.
25
 
However, he (like many other authors) chooses not to focus on these members of Muslim 
community. Instead he settles on a singular figure in the history of Muslim higher education in 
the Raj and a member of the Muslim elite: Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. 
 It is difficult to access literature on Muslims within South Asian education without 
finding at least one reference to the life and work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Sir Syed (1817-
1898), as he is commonly known, was a foundational figure in the movement for Muslim higher 
education. He first gained notoriety shortly after the 1857 Rebellion when he penned Asbāb-i-
Baġāvat-i-Hind (The Causes of the Indian Rebellion, 1858). Here, he presented an argument that 
the rebellion did not stem from an inherent lawlessness and disdain for authority thought to be 
innate in the Muslim populace. Instead, he argued that the rebellion stemmed from British 
policies that intimately offended a sense of citizenry (tehzīb) that had developed over the course 
of Indian history. Shortly thereafter in 1860, he published An Account of the Loyal 
Mohammedans of India, wherein he argued that India was not dar al-harb and that Indians and 
the British were not necessarily diametrically opposed to each other. He concluded this book by 
noting that India could benefit under the enlightened rule of the British. However it was not until 
after his visit to England in 1869 that he theorized that the Muslim population of India could 
benefit from a university modeled on Cambridge. His model of education sought to blend an 
English style of education with religious instruction and social discipline that would educate and 
uplift Indian Muslims back into an elite position in Indian society. Upon his return to India, he 
began an effort to establish the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (MAOC) at Aligarh, a city 
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in the NWP (MAOC is now known as Aligarh Muslim University). The college opened its doors 
to its first class of students in 1875. 
 Hardy‟s shift to discussing Sir Syed and the Aligarh Movement reveals a common tactic 
in Muslim educational historiography. An analysis of Sir Syed provides a glimpse into a narrow 




 For example, Hardy contended that Sir Syed, as a member of the elite class of educated 
Muslims, could make the case to fellow members of the intelligentsia that “modern education 
was not merely opposed to Islam, but was actually Islamic.”
27
 At the end of the chapter, Hardy 
emphasizes how limited this intelligentsia was and that the attempt by Sir Syed to establish an 
Anglo-Islamic site of higher education was ultimately quite small in scope. Noting that of the 
1,184 Muslim college-graduates between 1882 and 1892, a mere 220 came from Aligarh, Hardy 
argued that the purpose of the MAOC was to “produce a class of Muslim leaders with a footing 
in both Western and Islamic culture ... with a consciousness of their claims to be the aristocracy 
of the country.”
28
 It can be concluded that within this Indian milieu, Sir Syed was producing a 
site of knowledge for the (future) elite of India. David Lelyveld reaches a similar conclusion in 
that whereas, “the founders of Aligarh spoke in the name of all the Muslims of India,” MAOC 
was, “designed to make contact with a considerably narrower group. The North Indian Muslims 
literate in Urdu who formed the reservoir of Muslim intelligentsia and government servants.”
29
 If 
the subjects of these studies are so limited, then why are they the focus of analysis? Part of this 
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focus can be attributed to a shift in power relations – a shift that reached an apogee with 1857. 
The 1857 rebellion represented the final loss of power (and access to power) in an empire 
wherein Muslims represented a sizeable chunk of the ruling elite: it was a moment where a 
minority ruling elite transitioned into a minority non-ruling non-elite. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan 
entered this milieu by putting forth the idea that during this period of mourning, Hindus had 
already begun to enter government-aided educational institutions and were well on their way to 
establishing their own elite position in Indian society. Thus, the focus on Sir Syed can be 
attributed to the fact that he was one of the first Muslims after 1857 to make an attempt at 
documenting how Muslims could reestablish themselves in the South Asian elite.  
 Additionally, these texts provide inroads into the zeitgeist of urban, upper-class Muslims 
who were willing to enter tertiary education based on an English model. In particular, Lelyveld's 
work is outstanding in analyzing how pre-British sharīf culture (in the Indian context, this refers 
to the culture of the well-born ashraf class) transformed from an emphasis on education based in 
the home to the propagation of sharīf-bourgeois attitudes within the university or college setting. 
However, to draw upon the 1881 census, of the 50,121,585 Muslims in British India, 
approximately 25,760,440 were male. Of these, 5,099,463 were between the ages of 15 and 24 
(here assumed to be an age range appropriate for entering college).
30
 When Hardy states that 
only 1,184 Muslims attended universities in a ten-year span, one needs to remember that this 
represents a mere 0.02% of individuals within a peer group. While the idea of post-1857 power 
relations may answer the question about why these texts focused on a small subset of the Muslim 
population, the idea of eschewing a study of the Muslim masses in favor an elite class of 
individuals remains problematic. It must be reiterated that these individuals were one-fiftieth of 
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one percent of the college-aged male Muslim population. Once again, this is not a case of 
subalterns being silenced in the historiography of Indian education. These studies, while 
exhaustive, leave out nearly 99.8% of a peer Muslim population. The Muslim voice in education 
clearly does not lie within the sphere of university education. But, there existed another site of 
Muslim education: the madrasa and mahal. Two historians of Muslim education have routinely 
been hailed as foundational in analyses of religious education: Francis Robinson's work on 
Firangī Mahal and Barbara Metcalf's on the Dēobandī school. 
 Francis Robinson's The 'Ulama of Firangi Mahall studies the development of a rationalist 
school of Islamic thought within Mughal and British India. This school, established by in 1691 
by Mulla Qutub al-Dīn in the heart of Lucknow, UP (the term Firangī – Frankish – refers to the 
fact that the school was founded in the home of a French government servant who had left it to 
the Mughal state) was created during the height of the influence of Perso-Islamic culture within 
South Asia. The Firangī Mahal was characterized by Mulla Nizām al-Dīn's creation of the dars-i-
nizāmī syllabus, which emphasized the rationalist ma’qulat study of logic, philosophy, and 
theology, while also maintaining a balance of the manqulat studies of the tafsīr (transmission), 
hadīth, and fiqh (jurisprudence).
31
 The dars-i-nizāmī syllabus was a key component of 
instruction in the Mahal from its inception until the early 19
th
 century. The syllabus balanced 
formal learning in Persian, Arabic, and Urdu with spiritual development through manqulat and 
ma'qulat. Robinson goes as far as to note that by the late 18
th
 century, the Mahal was in a 
position to become the leading center for Islamic enlightenment. However, as the century 
progressed, the forces of “Islamic modernization” and “westernization” eventually led to a 
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decline in religious studies.
32
 However, it must be noted that the formation of a madrasa at 
Firangī Mahal did not occur until 1905. At this point, the school cellularized itself into 
classrooms and later began to refer to itself as “hamārē hīndustān kā kembridge” (“Our 
Hindustani Cambridge”).
33
 However, Robinson eventually concludes that while the Mahal 
created scholars, with a select number going on to enter bureaucratic service, it was not 
necessarily a “school.” He notes that those who entered government service were seen as going 
against the exalted religious standards of the school.
34
 While the Firangī Mahal was a leading site 
for Islamic scholarship and utilized a renowned syllabus, it cannot be considered a site for 
“education for the masses.” It lacked the geist of the English educational system: it did not seek 
to institute universal education, nor did it exist as a system of state-sponsored schools.   
 However, Barbara Metcalf's work on the Dēobandī madrasa presents a religious school 
that stands in contrast to its Lucknowī counterpart. The madrasa was established in 1867 in an 
old masjid in Dēoband, UP and quickly began to emulate the British bureaucratic style for 
educational institutions, rather than the traditional familial pattern of religious schools. From the 
moment of its creation, it utilized classrooms, a central library, a professional administrative 
staff, and annual pledges for its operating budget. Its students were admitted for fixed courses 
with prizes awarded at a yearly convocation. Later, the school would begin to set up satellite 
colleges staffed by its own graduates.
35
 The Dēobandī madrasa attempted to become a school 
that would rival its secular English counterpart while still remaining firmly Muslim. As such, the 
school utilized a modified version of the Firangī Mahal‟s dars-i-nizāmī syllabus that contained a 
greater emphasis on hadīth and fiqh. While the school did not include English or Western 
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subjects for study, it did not prevent its students from attending government-aided schools after 
graduating; however, after the six-year curriculum, few continued on for further study.
36
 Metcalf 
succinctly summarizes the goal of the school when she states that it “produced ulama, recruited 
from a widespread area, who disseminated a uniform religious ideology to many Muslims who 
welcomed teachings that emphasized common bonds among Muslims.”
37
  
 Who were these Muslims? Metcalf notes that 12% of donors came from local villages, 
28% from the district of Saharanpur to the east, 27% from the district of Muzaffarnagar to the 
south, nearly 18% from disparate locations in the remaining districts in the sprawl of the United 
Provinces, and the remaining 15% from the rest of India. The students were equally diverse, with 
one-third coming from the United Provinces, one-third from Punjab, and the final third from 
Bengal.
38
 However, when noting the social origin of both the students and the donors, Metcalf 
notes that the overwhelming majority came from the ashraf, or the well-born class of Muslims. 
Any donors who were not from the ashraf tended to be subordinates or clients from this class.
39
 
 Thus, the problem of elite education remains. The Firangī Mahal presented a prototypical 
example of religious education and the Dēobandī madrasa offered an opportunity for education 
that emulated the bureaucratic style of English education. However, while the list of donors and 
students were geographically diverse, they ultimately represented an upper-crust of society that 
could afford to send their sons off for a religious education. However, this should not be seen as 
a statement of an obvious conclusion. In “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial 
India,” Ranajit Guha contended that religious locales and apparatuses acted as a site for the 
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mobilization of the masses.
40
 It can be inferred that the Muslim masses may have accessed these 
sites of education. These schools made it clear that they did not discriminate in enrollment based 
upon on social class; tuition too was subsidized via public pledges – in short, a historical 
implication for their non-attendance does not exist. Once again, it must not be assumed that the 
silence of the masses in this strand of literature is a stand-in for an inability to attend. Metcalf 
indeed notes that an emphasis on religious education and a revitalized spirit of Muslim 
camaraderie had developed amongst members all socio-cultural strata during the era whence the 
Dēobandī madrasa was founded.
41
 
 An examination of the historiography of South Asian education has shown that exploring 
the presence of Muslims within colonial schools and finding a rationale of why the colonial state 
encouraged Muslims to attend these schools remains, at best, inadequate. It is important to start 
an analysis from the historical moments following the 1857 Rebellion: how did the British Raj 
come to channel a hostility against the Muslims of North India into an obsession with Muslim 
education? 
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Dangerous Muslims, Dangerous Children 
 
 In “Three Essays on Sexuality,” Sigmund Freud posited that the psychoanalytic process 
of sublimation occurs when sexual instincts are diverted from sexual aims and placed into non-
sexual pursuits.
1
 While this thesis will not deploy a Freudian psychoanalysis, the idea of 
sublimation is worth dwelling upon when considering the emphasis on Muslim education 
following the 1857 Rebellion. Whether consciously or not, the colonial fervor surrounding 
Muslims in the post-1857 milieu was transferred into the pursuit of socialization through 
education. Although the idea of sublimation remains a point to consider, this chapter seeks to 
illuminate why the colonial state began a push for Muslim education in the era immediately 
following the 1857 Rebellion. In order to do so, it first considers the notion of perfect religious 
neutrality and its implications in classifying a population. Following this, education reports, 
colonial correspondence, and the 1882 Education Commission are examined to consider how 
they represent incursions by a centralized ethnographic state. However, before considering these 
developments within a post-1857 educational apparatus, below is a brief recapitulation of the 
context and history of education within the East India Company and the nascent British Raj.  
Development of the Educational Apparatus 
 From the passage of the East India Company Act in 1784 until the implementation of the 
Charter Act of 1813, education was left under the purview of the East India Company Revenue 
Department in Bengal. Education first became a department of concern when Warren Hastings 
assumed the first Governor-Generalship of Bengal in 1773. The period of education beginning 
with his tenure is often deemed to be an “orientalist” era of education, due to Hastings' interest in 
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patronizing systems of education that were in line with assumptions regarding essentialist 
assumptions on the nature of South Asian culture.
2
 Furthermore, this period of orientalist 
education was characterized by Hastings‟ desire for the Company to become more sensitive to 
Indian languages and traditions through a process of “reverse acculturation” whereby civil 
servants would be trained in native languages and culture in order to become assimilated into 
South Asian society.
3
 Thus, orientalist education not only served to train assimilated civil 
servants, but also sought to manage or influence native education by using India‟s own cultural 
systems. For example, when petitioned for the construction of the Calcutta Madrasa by Bengali 
Muslims, Hastings replied enthusiastically in agreement with the petitioners, noting that “I have 
prosecuted the undertaking on my own means with no very liberal Supplies [and] I am now 
constrained to recommend to the Board . . . for a more adequate and permanent Endowment” for 
the madrasa.
4
 The madrasa would become the first educational institution established by the 
British, followed by the construction of the Benares Sanskrit College in 1791 and the landmark 
opening of the College of Fort William in Calcutta in 1800 by Lord Wellesley. Whereas the 
Calcutta Madrasa and the Sanskrit College represented Indian education as patronized by the 
British, the College of Fort William was established as a site for reverse acculturation. However, 
taken together, these three institutions represent a strong orientalist tradition within an early 
phase of educational development.  
 From 1815 to 1823, the administration of education shifted to the Territorial Revenue 
Department. However, an important change in the management of education occurred in 1813 
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with the promulgation of the East India Company Charter Act of 1813. Section 43 of the act 
stated that: 
 A sum of not less than one lack [sic] rupees in each year shall be set apart and   
 applied to the revival and improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the  
 learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of knowledge of  




 The Charter Act established both an institution for propagating education amongst 
Indians under company rule and a method for funding the project, although it has been noted that 
the bursary often remained unspent.
6
 Furthermore, the passage of this act granted missionaries – 
who were before greeted with hostility by the government – free entrance into East India 
Company territories. The arrival of these missionaries would usher in a new geist of “reform”: in 
the process of proselytizing, missionaries began to view Indian society and culture as intricately 
connected – conversion could only occur within a wholesale condemnation of Hinduism and 
Hindu society.
7
 This point of view would later lead to profound changes within educational 
policy. 
 The next shift in educational governance would occur in 1823 when the Bengal 
government announced the development of a separate political mechanism for education. The 
Territorial Revenue Department announced that all matters relating to education would be dealt 
with by a newly formed General Committee of Public Instruction. However, remnants of an idea 
that education would be best conducted through British perceptions of Indian cultural institutions 
remained: the committee would be under the administrative control of the Persian Secretary of 
the Political Department, who would conduct and oversee all correspondence between the 
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committee and the governor-general.
8
 The committee would remain under the purview of the 
Political Department until the abolition of the Persian Secretary in 1830. From this point, the 
administration of the educational apparatus would be transferred to the General Department. 
During this period, the previously mentioned project by Christian missionaries for reform began 
to take hold. In response, the orientalist view of upholding South Asian culture would begin to 
fade away, reaching an apogee with Thomas Babington Macaulay‟s famous and controversial 
1835 minute on education where he stated that the orientalist system of education should be 
abandoned in favor of one that would create “a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but 
English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.”
9
  
 1854 would represent the next monumental shift in the organization of education. In a 
despatch to the Governor-General, Secretary of State Sir Charles Wood wrote that the state was 
to consider how “useful and practical knowledge, suited to every station in life, may be best 
conveyed to the great mass of the people, who are utterly incapable of obtaining any education 
worthy of the name by their own unaided efforts.”
10
 More specifically, he called for the 
establishment of departments of education in each province, institution of university and 
presidency towns, establishment of teacher-training schools, maintenance of government 
colleges and high schools, establishment of new middle schools, emphasis on vernacular schools 
for elementary education, and the introduction of a system for grants-in-aid.
11
 This iteration of 
state-sponsored education was established with the liberal intention that the enlightening hand of 
English education would benefit the vast majority of Indians. The true weight of this hand would 
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not begin to fall upon Muslims until after the 1857 Rebellion. 
“Perfect Religious Neutrality:” An Ethnography  
 In 1858, W.R.B Chapman, the Inspector of Education in Bihar, found himself embroiled 
in a small scandal. After the publication of the “General Report on Public Instruction in the 
Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency for 1855-56,” it came to the Court of Directors of the 
Public Department‟s attention that Chapman had informed his native constituents that it was the 
order of government for children to attend school and any actions otherwise would result in 
punishment.
12
 In a public admonishment of Chapman's actions intended “for general information 
and for the guidance of all officers in the Education Department,” the Court of Directors not only 
stated their displeasure, but went as far as to say that: 
 10. The Government will adhere, with good faith, to its ancient policy of perfect   
 neutrality in matters affecting the religion of the people of India; and we most   
 earnestly caution all those in authority under it, not to afford by their conduct the  





 The conceptualization of perfect neutrality (which would later be referred to as perfect 
religious neutrality) would carry over into further discourse by the Education Department 
regarding Muslims and other religious identities. The question raised is: how could the colonial 
state begin a project of educational reform for Muslims (ostensibly a “religious identity”) while 
simultaneously espousing a conceptual framework predicated upon a process of rigid neutrality 
vis-à-vis religion? Is this simply a case of governmental dissonance wherein the state enthroned 
one theory but acted upon a wholly different praxis? The answer, of course, is no.  
 To understand how the colonial state implemented religious neutrality while engaging in 
a project of bringing Muslims into the purview of education, ideology must be seen as 
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foundational to this conceptualization. It was stated that the practice of religious neutrality was 
ancient: the usage of this modifier invokes a diachronic stability to this practice. That is to say, 
this practice is purported to have existed throughout an extended period of linear time; its 
stability also hints towards an intention that it will continue to exist.  
 To draw upon the Marxist theorist Louis Althusser, subjects within this framework are 
“always-already” within the conceptualization of religious neutrality. By always-already, it is 
meant that the materiality of religious neutrality (through colonial policy) allowed all members 
of the colonial state to act as religiously neutral subjects. To explain always-already, Althusser 
uses the example of a police officer yelling to an individual on a sidewalk. Instinctively, this 
person turns around, regardless of any notions of guilt. One cannot recall the moment in time 
when this instinctive impulse began – it was always already present. Likewise, religious 
neutrality acts as a similar concept: one may have accepted or contested its presence, but the 
presence itself could not have been denied. The state and the subject are never “outside” or 
“brought-into” this policy. This process is ideological – no individual can constitute the self 
outside of an ideological practice; thus creating an always-already ideology.
14
 This formulation 
lends credence to the idea that the Raj could not have simply said one thing and acted upon 
another. To put it simply, ideology is so penetrative that even the state must play by the rules of 
its own game.  
 What are the implications of considering perfect religious neutrality as an ideological 
practice? The mid-19
th
 century saw the rise of a particular branch of colonial ethnography that 
attempted to categorize, enumerate, and survey the colonized (the 1881 census can be seen as 
representative of these practices). This is to say that the colonial state made incursions to know 
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its subjects; it utilized information to place the colonized into discrete groups and classifications 
which could be both recognized and quantified.
15
  
 One is left with an ideology of perfect religious neutrality as put forth during an era of 
heightened ethnography. By combining these two ideas, it becomes evident that the term 
“Muslim” was not simply a signifier of a religious identity, but a recognition of a discrete 
ethnographic group. Ideology is imbued within state apparatuses; in turn, religious neutrality and 
ethnographic practice collided within the Muslim subject. Muslims were lumped into a discrete 
group that can be counted and doted upon within the annals of governance.  
 Why is it important to point out the concept of perfect religious neutrality? It can be 
argued that all states operate under the conceit of neutrality. Furthermore, the ethnographic 
divisions that perfect religious neutrality created were not limited to the Muslim population – not 
only did Muslims become “Muslims,” but Hindus became “Hindus.” However, perfect religious 
neutrality goes beyond the idea that it only accounted for a delineation of a discrete ethno-
religious/ethno-social group; this concept must be contextualized within a post-1857 mindset.  
Faisal Devji contended that the rumors spread during the 1857 Rebellion – whispered in 
bazaars and transmitted by way of chapattis to spread the idea that the British were greasing rifle 
cartridges with tallow – were in actuality not believed to be true by Muslim or Hindu rebels. 
Instead, these rebels claimed that “they were protesting on behalf of others, anonymous Indians 
whose opinions put the sepoys, their friends, and families at risk of ostracism . . . there was no 
presumption of any shared faith in such rhetoric, only the duty subsisting between these soldiers 
and their kith and kin.”
16
 This shared bond between Indian subjects was exemplified by an 
unspoken moral compact; one that was broken by the British. This idea was exemplified by the 
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exhortation put forth by Syed Ahmad Khan in Asbāb-i-Baġāvat-i-Hind that the British had 
violated a religious compact within public spaces by openly preaching and proselytizing in 
bazaars. In doing so, the British had violated the shared moral compact between state and 
subject. Keeping this in mind, perfect religious neutrality in the post-1857 milieu should be seen 
as a device formulated in response to the Rebellion; because this policy stated that all 
governmental actions were religiously neutral, the colonial state made it clear that it did not seek 
to operate within a religious formulation, quelling any fears of religious/moral transgression 
However, because perfect religious neutrality interpellates individuals into a religiously neutral 
construction, it simply “rebranded” the state‟s intentions of reform. Though these reforms were 
targeted at Muslims, the Raj could henceforth say that it did not seek to interfere in religious, 
moral, or ethnical matters. Instead, it implemented  methods for ruling over Muslims by 
operating on an ethno-social construction that publicly eschewed religion.  
 However, an issue with this system of ethnographic classification should be readily 
apparent. Muslim as a catch-all ethnographic category remains vague. Cached within it are 
identities that cross class (elite, bourgeois, peasant, or subaltern?), caste (Ashraf? Ajlaf?), intra-
religious (Sunni, Sh’ia?) and wide-spread geographic boundaries (North Indian, Bengali, 
Dakhni?). This thesis will not contest the lack of a localization of an identity. Instead, it seeks to 
illuminate a state process that was incredibly vague in its inception. It is the Muslim that the state 
seeks to change; a nebulous categorization that was nevertheless considered an entity that could 
be analyzed. Nevertheless, in the archival material being studied, this Muslim is mostly confined 
to North India, tending to come from the NWP and parts of Bengal, a location which Anil Seal 
described as “a generally backward region in terms of education and economic change,” but 





 While this may be true (within an elite sphere of the Muslim community), it must be 
repeated that British policy did not take this regional contextualization into account; a conclusion 
that state policy and public opinion were penned in suggestio falsi does not allow one to 
understand the implications of an intervention directed at a specific group (however vague it may 
be). Thus, this thesis will  look into this hazy category in the twenty-five years following the 
Rebellion to see how and why it was deployed and, ultimately, what were the effects of its 
deployment. 
Educational Reports and Reviews (1862-1871): Fanatical Muslims
18
 
 In April 1859, the Secretary of State for India circulated an Educational Despatch wherein 
he stated the Governor-General's desire for the publication of reports furnished by provincial 
Directors of Public Instruction regarding the progress of educational development.
19
 These 
reports included discussions on revenue collection, attendance, grant-in-aid schemes, 
scholarships, and the conditions of schools and colleges. Beginning in 1862, these reports were 
compiled and reviewed by the central government, setting a precedent to create quinquennial 
reviews of the Education Department.  
 The 1862 “Note on the State of Education in India” was compiled by A.M. Monteath, the 
Undersecretary to the Government of India in the Home Department. When discussing aspects of 
Muslim education, a small section of the report was devoted to the Calcutta Madrasa. When 
discussing the history of the institution, Monteath cited an excerpt from an 1858 minute by the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The minute provided a brief history of the madrasa, wherein it 
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was stated that, “this College was, however, consigned to the uncontrolled management of 
Mahommedan Professors, and the consequence was that the studies of the College became 
nominal.”
20
 However, in 1820 “the College was placed under immediate English 
superintendence, and after that change the abuses . . . were less gross and flagrant.” The excerpt 
goes on to cite a letter from Dr. Sprenger, the 1850 principal of the madrasa: “'The system,' Dr. 
Sprenger stated, is in fact precisely the same as the one which was in vogue in Europe during the 
darkest ages.'”
21
 In response, the Education Department reorganized the madrasa in 1850 by 
dividing it into a “Senior Department and  Junior Department. In the former only Arabic 
literature and Mohammadan Law are taught.” The reformation was declared a success in 1860 
due to the introduction of “a more modern and rational system of instruction in the Arabic 
language and in the principles of Mahommedan Law for the antiquated and faulty system of the 
Indian Moulovies.”
22
 The institution was declared to be on “more satisfactory footing” in 1860 
by the new principal of the madrasa, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nassau Lees, who stated that: 
 These results show that the Moulovies of late have been more attentive to their   
 duties; and I am inclined to hope that they have at length realized the fact that the  
 Calcutta Madrissa is a Government Institution; that it is the Government and not  
 the Professors who are responsible for the nature and education given to its   




 What is presented here is a fairly straightforward example of a knowledge/power 
relationship. That is to say that the colonial state saw itself as capable of utilizing its own 
techniques of knowledge transmission and syllabus creation in order to bestow upon the native a 
knowledge that the irrational Muslim was incapable of putting forth.
24
 This trope of irrationality 
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relied on an implication that Muslim forms of education were ossified in the past as a relic – they 
were incapable of bridging the gap between pre-modern and modern modes of knowledge. 
Furthermore, there existed a belief that this aversion to rational thinking was endemic to Islam: 
Sir William Muir, the Secretary to the Government of the NWP (who later became the 
Lieutenant-Governor of the NWP in 1868), wrote in The Life of Mahomet that Muslims were 
naturally irrational. When discussing the improbability of the miracles conducted by the Prophet 
Muhammad, Muir wrote that, “under the shelter of the civil arm and fanatical credulity of the 
people, these marvelous legends grew up in perfect security from rational inquiry.”
25
 The idea 
presented is that any form of education borne from such a religion would naturally be irrational.   
Hence, the Muslim subject who studied under these pre-modern forms of education 
would become a victim of an unenlightened educational system. Here, the Raj saw itself as being 
able to develop a syllabus that eschewed the antiquarian while remaining true to religious laws 
that were at the heart of a classical Muslim education. When describing the condition of the 
madrasa in 1820, it went without qualification that the “uncontrolled” management of Muslim 
professors would lead to institutional decay. The use of the term uncontrolled is especially 
important – it is the reassertion of control of the institution by the Raj that allowed education to 
begin to flourish anew. What remains most interesting, however, is the insistence of government 
control over the madrasa’s studentry.  
 To understand why the colonial state would insist upon ownership of the Calcutta 
Madrasa, one needs to recall the date of publication of this document: 1860. The trauma of the 
1857 Rebellion remained a fresh memory in the minds of many state administrators. When 
recalling the Rebellion, it was the resounding opinion that many within the religious community 
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were prominent in revolt.
26
 Furthermore, many within the government found Muslims in general 
to be devoted to a religion that inculcated fanaticism.
27
 For example, W.W. Hunter in The Indian 
Musalmans commented that, “Their [Muslims‟] fanaticism, for which ample warrant can always 
be found in the Kuran [sic], has been hotly excited, until at last there is a danger that the entire 




To return to Lees‟ exhortation, there is an implication in the text that, left to their own 
measures, the maulvis (an honorific title given to Sunni religious scholars) – who carry within 
them an omnipresent threat of fanaticism – are incapable of providing an education. This, in turn, 
harks to a paranoia borne out of 1857 that saw an uncontrolled religious class as the seeds of 
revolt. What was seen here was a two-fold process. First, the state utilized a technique of social 
classification to identify Muslims as naturally irrational or fanatic. Second, the state asserted that 
only it had the ability to take control of the questionable religious school to ensure the proper 
education of its students; this, in turn, was an example of the colonial state positioning itself to 
placate the fanatic rebels of 1857.  
Of course, this classification of Muslims-as-fanatic was a part of a larger post-1857 
project of knowledge gathering. As Nicholas Dirks argued: “It was as if during these years after 
the rebellion the centralization of (and control over) knowledge was tantamount to the 
centralization of (and control over) power itself.”
29
 The strategy of the centralized colonial state 
in using (and deploying) knowledge-gathering techniques, whether they were tracts on the origin 
of Islam or the Education Department‟s meditation on the Calcutta Madrasa, should be seen as a 
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part of a larger project by the state to centralize power and reassert control and dominance over 
the rebellious and fanatical Muslim. Therefore, the identification of Muslims as fanatical and the 
subsequent use of this knowledge by the Education Department must always be seen in tandem 
with the perceived trauma of 1857.  
 For further rationale behind this point of view, one may consult a reform scheme for the 
Calcutta and Hooghly madrasas penned by Lees in 1870 and forwarded via the Home 
Department to E.C. Bayley, the Secretary to the Government of India. In a section regarding the 
study of religious law and the duty of the state to provide for an institution for the study thereof, 
he stated that: 
I have not had the advantage of seeing any of the papers which are in the  
 possession of Government regarding Mahomedan conspiracies, which might   
 elucidate this portion of the subject; but so confident am I in my own opinion, that  
 I would assert without any fear that it is not the learned, but, on the contrary, the  
 ignorant, who, as a rule, are most ready not only to listen to, but to preach treason,  
 and that it has been so in Bengal from all time. In fact it is notorious that those   
 Mahomedans who are now supposed to be the enemies of the British Government,  
 are in the opinion of the Maulawis of the Madrassah and the Sunnies,    
 generally heterodox and outside of the law. Any system of instruction which   
 would favor the training of biogtted [sic] Moslems, should be avoided, but . . . I am of  
 the opinion that not only the wisest and best plan, but the easiest and safest plan   
 is, not to deprive them of any of the facilities they now enjoy of acquiring a   
 knowledge of their own literature . . . instead of rooting it up or destroying it . . . and 
 leaving its Mahomedan subjects dependent upon such Madrassahs as Fuzl Alis for  




 This resolution, along with a packet of over 200 pages containing recommendations by 
Lees, a committee convened by the Education Department to reform the Calcutta and Hooghly 
Madrasas, and C.H. Campbell of the Board of Revenue, were received by Bayley. Most of the 
propositions contained therein, including a resolution agreeing with Lees to appoint a “European 
gentlemen of repute as an Arabic scholar, with the power of teaching the upper classes in 
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English,” were accepted by Bayley and forwarded to the Secretary of State for India in London.
31
 
A distinct paranoia regarding the religious classes had developed amongst those in the Education 
Department; it must be repeated again that, in this post-1857 realm, only the state could oversee 
and provide for the proper education of its Muslim students.  
–––– 
 
 The next educational review was compiled in 1867, again by A.M. Monteath. This report 
covered the period between 1862 and 1866, with an emphasis placed on educational reviews 
received between 1865 and 1866. This review took a markedly different stance on public 
education when compared to its 1862 counterpart. In the opening section, titled “General 
Resume of Educational Operations in the Several Presidencies and Provinces of India,” 
Monteath wrote that, “it may, I think, be reasonably doubted whether the theory of the downward 
filteration of education, however true as a general principle, will not be found wanting when 
applied to the lowest strata of the population.”
32
 This point would again be repeated by Monteath 
in the 1867 review, wherein he stated that, “schools – whose object should be, not to train highly 
a few youths, but to provide more opportunities, than now exist, for the acquisition of such an 
improved education as will make those who possess it more useful members of society in every 
condition of life.”
33
 A shift in focus for education beyond the (urbanized) elite classes 
represented an overall incursion by the colonial state into the countryside – once again a part of 
the project by the state to know its native subject. However, this process of knowledge gathering 
was not simply limited to the census; here, it is seen to penetrate the impulses behind 
                                                 
31
 NAI, No. 299, Home Department, Education, August 19, 1871 (encl. ibid.). See also NAI, No. 19, Home 
Department, Education, August 19, 1871 (encl. ibid.).  
32
 A.M. Monteath, “Note on the State of Education in India 1865-66,” in Selections from Educational Records, ed. 
K.G. Saiyidain, 126.  
33
 NAI, No. 27 A – 27 C, Home Department, Education, A.P Howell, “Note on the State of Education in India 





 Herein, one must recall the previous point on perfect religious neutrality and 
ethnographic divisions – attempts at knowledge gathering by the colonial state utilized this 
ideological maneuver to classify and categorize its populace. The following table, taken from 
Monteath's review, can be seen as representative of this separation: 
 




Pupils attending Higher Class Schools 
 Bengal N.W. Provs Punjab Madras Bombay Total 
Hindoos 16,828 2,360 9,377 5,063 1,337 34,965 
Mahomedans 1,561 375 3,362 473 28 5,799 
Pupils attending Middle Class Schools 
Hindoos 40,896 13,783 5,784 12,085 21,207 93,755 
Mahomedans 4,241 3,380 2,238 682 1,634 12,175 
Pupils attending Lower Class Schools 
Hindoos 32,374 1,21,713 29,125 14,049 63,653 2,60,914 
Mahomedans 5,040 32,903 24,816 87 4,947 67,793 
 
 
TOTAL Hindoos 3,89,634 





The review went to argue that the percentage of students within the Lower Class Schools 
is “probably not far from the actual proportion borne by the Mahomedans to the Hindoo 
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population of the country generally.”
36
 The numbers presented in the above table raise quite a 
few questions – many of which remain unanswered and will not be considered within the scope 
of this thesis. First, the drop-out rate amongst Muslims was incredibly high. Within Bengal (a 
province with a large number of Muslims
37
) the number of Muslim students drops by 16% from 
Lower Class to Middle Class schools and by 63% from Middle Class to Higher Class (although 
the latter decrease seems to be a trend that was equally applicable to both Hindus and Muslims in 
each province). Why were these students dropping out in such large numbers and why was this 
occurring when the colonial administration seemed to be advocating for Muslim education? Was 
the colonial push for Muslim education all rhetoric with no teeth? Or was there a norm for 
Muslim children to receive a few years of education before dropping out? Finally, why were the 
numbers for Muslim students similar in Bengal (31% of the total province population) and 
Bombay (18%), even though Muslims were a much smaller percentage of the total population in 
Bombay?  
However, what cannot be contested is that the above table demonstrates that Muslim 
education was paltry. But why juxtapose it against the ethnographic category of the “Hindu”? 
Recall W.W. Hunter‟s warning: the fanatic force of Islam combined with a lack of education 
would eventually transform into a “danger that the entire Muhammadan community will rapidly 
be transformed into a mass of disloyal ignorant fanatics on the one hand, with a small class of 
men highly educated in a narrow fashion on the other, highly fanatic, and not unwarrantably 
discontented, exercising an enormous influence over their ignorant fellow-Muhammadans.”
38
 
Thus, even a juxtaposition of numbers and ethnographic categories hints towards a fear of 
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rebellion. Whereas the “flexible Hindus” have “cheerfully acquiesced” to British form of 
education, Muslims have held aloof.
39
  Their ignorance, combined with an innate religious 
fanaticism, could only result in a discontent and rebellion that would be led by a small number of 
individuals who were educated (such as the fanatic/irrational maulvi). This ethnographic 
comparison is representative of the post-1857 milieu as extending to the children of Muslims. 
This is to say that because Muslims are dangerous, their children represent a potentiality of 
danger. The only solution to this predicament is to bring these children into the school – to 
socialize them out of fanaticism and into the (perceived) docility of the Hindu community in 
order to prevent further rebellion. But how would this be accomplished? Through the 




 The educational report of 1870-71 will be the final quinquennial report discussed. 
Compiled in 1872 by A.P. Howell, the Under Secretary in the Home Department, it provides 
insights not only into the ethnographic considerations of Muslim education, but also a window 
into how the state attempted to cull the Muslim population into government-aided schools 
following the 1857 Rebellion. 
 Why attempt to bring Muslim children into government-aided schools – what was the 
danger of a middle school student? It must be repeated that Muslim children did not present the 
clear-and-present danger that, for example, Muslim rebels in 1857 presented. However, these 
children represented the potential for future fanaticism if they were not properly socialized into 
modes of British rule. There existed a need for the school as a site of socialization to prevent 
another 1857.  
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However, the question remains: besides classifying Muslims as fanatic and asserting 
control over religious schools, how did the colonial state go about ensuring enrollment in the 
bulk of Indian schools? Howell, in reference to the 1854 despatch that established the Education 
Department discussed the establishment of the position of directors, inspectors, and instructors 
for Indian schools. These positions were to be filled by Europeans or native collaborators.
40
 
Howell then goes on to cite an 1859 despatch to note the duties of those in these positions: 
 To exercise a close scrutiny into all the agencies in operation throughout the   
 country for the instruction of the people, to point out deficiencies wherever they   
 exist; to suggest remedies to the Government, and bring the advantages of   
 education before the minds of the various classes of the community; to act as the  
 channel of communication on the subject between Government and community at  
 large; and generally to stimulate and promote, under the prescribed rules, all   




 The emphasized sentence can be seen as indicative of the development of a 
bureaucratized system of collaboration. The term collaboration is used here because these 
officers were “on-the-ground” representatives of the colonial apparatus and as such acted in 
accordance with the interests of the state with regards to education. This is to say that it was the 
job of a select number of individuals to collaborate with and act as a proxy of the state vis-à-vis 
the population at large. Thus, and this is true of all educational systems, the school acted as a site 
of socialization: wherein the state could watch over and ensure the proper social and educational 
development of its youngest subjects. To examine how this functioned in the Raj, the table on the 
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 Number of Officers 
 Direction Inspection Instruction Total 
 European Native European Native European Native European Native 
Bengal 1 . . . 8 98 52 1,126 61 1,224 
Madras 1 . . . 7 49 39 282 47 331 
Bombay 1 . . . 5 35 23 1,409 29 1,444 
N.W.P 1 . . . 7 78 31 696 39 774 
Punjab 1 . . . 7 3 24 142 32 145 
Oudh 1 . . . 1 11 4 144 6 155 
Central Provinces 1 . . . 3 20 9 249 13 269 
British Burmah 1 . . . . . . . . . 4 20 5
 
20 
Coorg . . . . . . 1 . . . 2 32 3 32 
TOTAL 8 . . . 39 294 188 4,100 235 4,394 
The Berars 1 . . . 2 6 2 388 5 394 
GRAND TOTAL 9 . . . 41 300 190 4,488 240 4,788 
 
The grand total of both European and Native collaborators at each bureaucratic level was 
5,028. The total number of students within government and aided schools can be ascertained 
from revenue calculation: the state noted that from fees (but not from actual attendance), the total 
number of pupils in these provinces was 449,788.
43
 The ratio of collaborators to students was 
roughly 89 students per collaborator; however, because the number of students actually attending 
schools was bound to be less than the number indicated in revenue collection, this ratio was in all 
likelihood much smaller.  
However, what is immediately evident is that these collaborators were almost 
overwhelmingly native (a ratio of nearly twenty to one). It can be argued that a system of 
procuring students would be more effective if Europeans were responsible for enrolling native 
students. One must once again recall Sir Syed Ahmad Khan‟s Asbāb-i-Baġāvat-i-Hind, wherein 
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he stated that, “The Pargunnah Ministers and Deputy Inspectors, who went to every village and 
town to admonish the people to put their own sons into these schools, had in every village the 
name of the „black chaplain‟ . . . The common people expressed the opinion that these were 
Christian schools and were made to convert them to Christians.”
44
 What Sir Syed‟s analysis 
demonstrated was that European inspectors were often viewed with suspicion and were 
considered to always carry with them the ulterior motive of converting children into Christians. 
However, it was H. Stewart Reid, the Director of Public Instruction in the NWP, who realized 
that “the fears of the people were allayed when Hindus and Mahomedans were placed in charge 
of their schools.”
45
 The presence of the Native collaborator acted to enroll potential students in 
government-aided schools by assuaging the fears of parents: a familiar face, even if tied to the 
state apparatus, was a simple tactic to bring children into the Raj‟s schools. This idea was 
reiterated by E.C. Bayley, who stated that, “In avowedly English schools established in 




This conceptualization of Indian collaboration in the Education Department was another 
example of the long-arm of 1857 reaching into colonial policy. The dangerous children of a 
dangerous Muslim population had to be brought into the colonial schoolhouse to become 
properly socialized subjects of the British Empire; however, their entrance into the school was 
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predicated upon a system of native collaborators who acted as a liaison between the school and 
the state. These interlocutors were an integral part of the apparatus for the push for and 
implementation of Muslim education.  
Correspondence (1870-1873): The End of Muslim Hegemony 
 In June of 1871, the Viceroy Earl of Mayo penned a note for circulation for the Education 
Department. He stated that, “There is no doubt, that as regards the Mahomedan population, our 
present system of education is, to great extent a failure.”
47
 What drove him to this conclusion 
was that although the “differences in the relative numbers of Hindoo or Mussulman population in 
the different Provinces may of course, account in some measure, for the disproportion of 
numbers,” it could not be denied that the statistics presented a “lamentable deficiency in the 
education of a large mass of what was, not very long ago, the most powerful race in India.”
48
 
This was reiterated in a memorandum by J. O'Kinleay, who stated that it was English rule that 
destroyed the hegemony of the Muslims. He assumed that Muslims believed that “an English 
education might undermine their religion” and that “it is not lawful to learn English, or the 
language of any other non-Mussulman people, except for the purpose of answering letters, or of 
combating the religious arguments of that people.”
49
 E.C. Bayley agreed: “The truth is that, 
before the advent of the English, the Mahomedans were not merely the main political, but the 
main intellectual power of the state.”
50
 These assumptions seem strikingly similar to those put 
forth by W.W. Hunter in The Indian Musalmans, which was published just two months before the 
circulation of these letters. Indeed, it was Mayo who requested that Hunter write the book in May 
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of 1871; Hunter proceeded to write the book in just three weeks.
51
 He wrote that it was the 
policies of the Raj that had dealt Muslim education its “death-blow.”
52
 Because of these 
injustices, Hunter argued, the Muslims led the rebellion against British authority in 1857.  
 What each argument shared in common was a belief that the Muslims had “fallen from 
grace.” That is to say that there existed a point of view that the arrival of the British ushered in an 
era of challenged Muslim hegemony – Muslims were unceremoniously transformed from a 
ruling minority elite into a non-ruling, non-elite, minority population. The lack of education 
amongst the Muslim population was therefore a function of its own decline at the hands of the 
British. In the eyes of the Raj, if Muslims rebelled in 1857 in an attempt to restore authority of a 
figure-head emperor, then there existed a risk of it occurring again. The olive branch of 
education was not necessarily linked to that of progress or modernization. Instead, it was a tool 
for resocialization. As Lees stated in his report regarding the Calcutta Madrasa, “The best means 
of all of breeding discontent among any class of Her Majesty's Indian subjects is to give them a 
high class education and then turn them adrift on society to starve.” His solution? “At present 




Providing an education was to provide a means for an entry way into a nascent middle-
class; an attempt at hegemony without dominance. Once again, 1857 lurked beneath educational 
policy – it went without question that the British had usurped the Muslims‟ position as the ruling 
class of India. To prevent this large population from trying once again to reestablish their 
dominance, the British utilized English education in government-aided schools as a means to 
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placate Muslim discontent by using education as a means for Muslims to partially restore their 
status within Indian society and become a part of the colonial bourgeoisie.  
The Hunter Education Commission of 1882 
 The Education Commission of 1882, commonly known as the Hunter Commission, was 
convened on February 3rd, 1882 with a resolution that stated “that, while the Government 
acknowledged the mastery and comprehensive outline supplied by that [1854] Despatch, they 
deemed it of importance to review the progress made, and to enquire how far the superstructure 
corresponded with the original design.”
54
 The Commission, published in 1883 in a report of over 
600 folios and 222 resolutions, discussed the state and progress of education in India nearly 
thirty years after the 1854 establishment of the Education Department. The Commission set out 
to judge the progress of education in the British Raj by drawing upon dispatches, minutes, 
provincial reports, and interviews from 1854 to 1882. The Commission was presided over by 
W.W. Hunter, who was then a member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council. Interestingly, Sir 
Syed Ahmad Khan was amongst its members (he later withdrew and was replaced by his son, 
Syed Mahmud). This connection between the Muslim elite and the Raj will be expounded upon 
in the next chapter as an example of the elite as part of the Gramscian notion of the “passive 
revolution.”  
 Evidence within the Commission was gleaned from 193 witnesses across India, whose 
testimony was deemed to be “a unique exposition of the most trustworthy opinion in India 
regarding the instruction of the people.”
55
 It is important to note that while these individuals were 
referenced and utilized as a source of information regarding the state of education, they were 
neither named nor mentioned within the body of the argument; instead, they were relegated to an 
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appendix. Unsurprisingly, these witnesses were culled from an elite Muslim population, the 
majority of whom were employed by the colonial state – once again, an example of the passive 
revolution deployed during the process of reform. The fact that a small population of elites 
conveyed testimonies to the Commission is especially important when considering the 
resolutions adopted for the Muslim population. In the chapter titled “Education of Classes 
Requiring Special Treatment,” one must be keenly aware of the presence of these interlocutors. 
Though obvious, it must be repeated that while the subject of these reforms remained silent, the 
colonial state attempted to speak in his name in order to further its own means and accomplish its 
own goals.   
 The fundamental question taken up by the Commission is should be familiar: why have 
Muslims not enrolled in government institutions in large numbers? In what reads like a laundry-
list summary of the causes of poor enrollment in English schools, the Commission states that, 
“the small proportion of Muhammadan teachers,” “minor faults in the Departmental system,” 
“well-to-do Muhammadans educating their children at home,” “their hereditary love of the 
profession of arms,” “the absence of friendly intercourse between Muhammadans and 
Englishmen,” and finally, “the most power factors are to be found in pride of race, a memory of 
bye-gone superiority, religious fears, and a not unnatural attachment to the learning of Islam,” 
are all to blame.
56
 By now, the majority of these reasons should seem familiar. Seen within them 
is a desire to begin a state intervention to socialize the Muslim populace in the post-1857 era. 
While these reasons are cited without reference to the reality of the Muslim on the ground, it 
must be noted that the Hunter Commission represents the apogee of an ideal. Cached in this text 
were a condensed version of nearly twenty-five years of justification for Muslim education and a 
rationale for conducting a project of socializing the Muslim population of the Raj in the years 
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following the 1857 Rebellion.  
Conclusion 
 When considering why the Raj decided to make an incursion into the education of the 
Muslim community, one must begin by looking at the policy of perfect religious neutrality. This 
policy, if considered as an ideological maneuver, allowed the state to divorce a religious identity 
from an ethnographic. In this act, Muslim identity was reduced to an entity that could be 
enumerated and therefore considered to have definable traits. However, this process is important 
in the post-1857 milieu because it put forth the idea that the colonial state did not seek to 
intervene in religious matters, even though it conducted reform through the ethno-social category 
of “Muslim.” Simultaneously, one must always consider the presence of the 1857 Rebellion 
when analyzing the colonial push Muslim education within the British Raj. As has been shown, 
the ghost of 1857 loomed over the policy decisions of the colonial state. The actions of the Raj 
were predicated upon a fear of fanaticism and discontent of the Muslim rebels (and their 
children) of 1857. With this in mind, Chapter II will consider the ramifications of this push for 






 This chapter will consider the ramifications of the colonial push for Muslim education as 
outlined in the first chapter. Specifically, it will consider the formation of the trope of the 
“uneducated Muslim.” Before this identity is examined, however, ethnographic data will be 
taken at “face-value” in order to determine whether Muslims were or were not attending 
government-aided schools. Through this analysis, it becomes clear that Muslims attended 
colonial schools in equally dismal numbers as other ethno-religious groups. Why then, did the 
trope of being uneducated develop specifically within the Muslim population and not within any 
other? This question cannot be analyzed by an analysis that is limited to the instrumentality of 
the state in formulating and demarcating identities. Through this delimitation, a nexus between 
the colonial state and Muslim elite can be discerned. Paradoxically, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who 
intended to bring forth an Islamic modernization, utilized similar language as the colonial state in 
a drive for Muslim higher education. This process should be viewed as an example of a “passive 
revolution” as outlined by Antonio Gramsci and later expounded upon by Partha Chatterjee. 
Through this analysis, one finds the presence of a dominant discourse wherein large swaths of 
the Muslim populace were being spoken for.  
Ethnographic Data 
 The Hunter Education Commission and the 1881 Census both provide numerical data that 
allows one to ascertain the state of education within “Hindu” and “Muslim” communities. These 
religious divisions are looked upon as somewhat suspect, mainly due in part that these discrete 
identities were based upon enumerated ethnographic data as put forth by the Raj.
1
 However, the 
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ethnographic data within these publications provides for a window into the information used by 
the Raj to create justifications for the project of Muslim education (as outlined in Chapter I). This 
is to say that these numbers provide an opportunity to survey the numerical landscape that was 
utilized by the Raj when creating colonial policy. Below is a table culled from both the Hunter 
Commission and the 1881 Census, juxtaposing Muslim and Hindu populations in select regions 
within the British Raj with information regarding the number of Muslim and Hindu men enrolled 
in government-aided schools (the use of men is reflective of the limited data presented within 
these materials): 










 Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim 




9134157 2002744 296790 41548 
Bengal 22578544 10855771 779623 236643 
NWP (British 
Territory) 
19813098 3022445 183767 36826 
Punjab (British 
territory) 




3700467 140611 71756 5929 
Assam 1580458 673189 35131 6681 




4517812 469446 31158 4604 
 
Total 79404107 23764319 1782955 399711 
 
 From this information, it can be deduced that within these regions, only 2.3% of Hindu 
and 1.7% of Muslim males attended schools within the Raj. However, without a numerical 
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comparison, these percentages are somewhat meaningless. In this case, one must refer back to 
Sir Charles Wood's 1854 Educational Despatch wherein he stated that it was the purpose of the 
Education Department to provide for “useful and practical knowledge, suited to every station in 
life [that] may be best conveyed to the great mass of the people, who are utterly incapable of 
obtaining any education worthy of the name by their own unaided efforts.”
3
 According to the 
goals set out by the Education Department, the Raj's educational apparatus was to reach out to 
the Indian masses. While this goal was numerically vague, the usage of the term “great mass of 
the people” certainly implies a significant percentage of the population. Instead, twenty-eight 
years after the formal establishment of the Education Department, less than 3% of Hindus and 
Muslims were attending government schools. Like the Muslim population, Hindus were not 
attending these schools in large numbers proportional to their overall population. Despite this 
fact, there was not an explicitly stated desire within the colonial administration to bring large 
swaths of the Hindu population into the school. One is left with a large corpus of archival 
material that stresses the fact that Muslims were not attending government schools, even while 
Hindus were not attending in proportionally large numbers. Why then, did the trope of the 
“uneducated Muslim” develop? 
The Uneducated 
 But, what does the trope of the “uneducated Muslim” mean? That is to say, what does it 
mean for an institution (colonial education) to allow for the formation of a group identity? 
Bernard Cohn explored how the activity of conducting a census ultimately allowed for a process 
of objectification to occur, thereby allowing a population to (re)consider and (re)formulate their 
own social structure in new or different ways.
4
 Objectification refers to the process whereby 
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individuals are abstracted into a thing or entity. It is only within this abstraction wherein one is 
able to dwell upon the self in order to analyze it. This process should seem familiar – it was 
deployed in the ethnographic consideration of “Muslim” as an abstract group as seen within the 
doctrine of perfect religious neutrality. One has arrived at a point of near reciprocal 
objectification: it first occurred between the colonial state and subject when demarcating 
ethnographic groups. However, it was only after this process where the subject was presented 
with an objectified notion of the self and could begin to meditate upon his own identity. To speak 
of this process in such reductive terms would seem to ease the tension inherent within it. The 
creation of the trope of the uneducated Muslim should not be seen as a collective effort by a 
large group of Muslims. Instead, as will be shown, the process of identity creation in this 
instance was initially limited to the state's incursions into the Muslim community, but was later 
taken up by the Muslim elite in the passive revolution of Islamic modernization. Before this can 




 Although it has been shown that the push for education can be traced back to the years 
immediately following the 1857 Rebellion, the idea of the uneducated Muslim began to gain 
traction in the 1870s. In 1871, the Viceroy Earl of Mayo stated that within the Muslim population 
there was a “lamentable deficiency in the education of a large mass of what was, not very long 
ago, the most powerful race in India.”
6
 In a previous letter, E.C. Bayley stated that, “The truth is 
that, before the advent of the English, the Mahomedans were not merely the main political, but 
the main intellectual power of the state;” an unsubtle implication that Muslims no longer held 
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this title.  
 These sentiments would be repeated by W.W. Hunter in The Indian Musulmans. He wrote 
that, “our system of public instruction . . . is opposed to the traditions, unsuited to the 
requirements, and hateful to the religion, of the Musalmans.”
7
 Hunter argued that the entire 
system of instruction, including government-aided (and religiously neutral) schools, colleges, 
and universities conducted in both English and vernacular languages, were entirely unfit for the 
Muslim community. Commenting on the progress of the development of education in India, he 
wrote that: 
 During the first seventy-five years of our Rule we continued to make use of this   
 [Pre-British] system as a means for producing officers to carry out our    
 administration. But meanwhile we had introduced a scheme of Public Instruction  
 of our own; and as soon as it trained up a generation of men on the new plan, we  
 flung aside the old Muhammadan system, and the Musalman youth found every   
 avenue of public life closed in their faces. 
 Had the Musalmans been wise, they would have perceived the change, and   




 The conclusion here is clear: not only were Muslims not entering colonial schools, but 
they were doubly unwise in the fact that they did not perceive the changes in the system of 
education of the East India Company and the Raj. To repeat, the uneducated Muslim has thus far 
been located in a subject who did not or could not conform to the educational apparatus as 
created by the state. The state of being uneducated was also linked to a perceived staunch 
disavowal of the means of education as laid out by the Raj.  
 This point of view was reiterated in the Hunter Education Commission. The Commission 
stated that “'the endeavour to impart a high order of English education' to the Muhammadan 
community had completely failed.”
9
 In explaining this failure, it was stated that “the most 
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powerful factors are to be found in pride of race, a memory of bygone superiority, religious fears, 
and a not unnatural attachment to the learning of Islam.”
10
 While the Commission does note that 
“there had been a tendency to exaggerate the backwardness of the Muhammadans,” it 
nevertheless reaches the conclusion that, “we here accept the fact that at all events in many parts 
of the country, the Musalmans have fallen behind the rest of the population.”
11
  
 What is termed the “uneducated Muslim” in this thesis is a reference to a perception of 
the Muslim subject as one that has both fallen behind in terms of entering the educational 
apparatus, as well as one that is at a distinct structural disadvantage. This disadvantage was 
derived from a combination of religion and politics. This is to say that the Muslims‟ affinity for 
religious education existed as one barrier to entry, while political languidness acted as the other. 
As the “former rulers of India,” Muslims had established modes of education that utilized their 
own religious and cultural customs to educate and train students for state-sponsored 
employment. The rise of British hegemony in the subcontinent displaced these forms of 
education. Due to a cultural torpidity, Muslims neither perceived nor reacted to the change. Thus, 
the uneducated Muslim was not simply uneducated: he was structurally incapable of attending 
government-aided schools.  
 But, how did this cultural identity emerge and disseminate? Sanjay Seth, who identified 
this trope as the “backwards, but proud Muslim,”
12
 locates this process within a relationship 
between the governmentalized state and the colonial subject.
13
 The argument is built upon the 
idea of governmentality from Michel Foucault wherein the primary administrative function of 
the state is not to use its power to destroy life, but to invest in it, thereby guaranteeing the life of 
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 Through governmentality, the paradox of the modern state may be reconciled: an 
enlarged bureaucracy can come alongside an increased investment in individual liberties because 
the state uses its increased size to guarantee its subjects life and liberty. Using this idea, Seth 
concluded that the colonial state differed from the modern state in that the former promised the 
possibility of these liberties, but because this iteration of governance was based upon the 
dominance of the colonizer (who controlled the state apparatus) over the colonized, the 
actualization of these liberties would almost always be indefinitely deferred.
15
  
Colonial education fit into this idea of an “almost there” bureaucratic patronage. The 
Education Department was established in order to bring forth moral and educational 
development as an individual right to the “great masses of the people.” In short, education was 
designed for the betterment of the colonized. However, the state could locate backwardness in 
those who did not engage in this reciprocal idea: backwardness was derived from those who did 
not take part in the educational process. Being uneducated or backwards can therefore be seen as 
an identity that emerged from the perspective of the state. This is to say that being Muslim and 
being backward “embodied a particular perspective from which this fact could be brought into 
being as a fact and seen as such. The perspective was that of the governmentalized state, which 
governs a population.”
16
 The notion that identity formation can be traced back to the colonial 
state apparatus is convincing, especially in light of the fact that Muslim education seemed to be a 
process that was instituted by the colonial state.  
 The power of the state to formulate identities cannot be denied. This fact was seen in the 
previous chapter wherein it was shown that ethnographic practices found in educational reports 
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and the census served to locate, demarcate, and ultimately create identities. Through this process 
an individual who held a multiplicity of identities (for example: Bengali, male, member of the 
subordinate classes), but also practiced Islam could be reductively abstracted into the ethno-
religious identity of “Muslim” through a process of enumeration. However, while state power is 
one method to locate the creation and propagation of the uneducated Muslim, one cannot simply 
reduce the dissemination of this identity as coming forth from the hands of the state. Equally 
important was the Muslim elite, who utilized the same language as the colonial state in its call 
for Muslim education. The presence of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's equally ardent appeal for Muslim 
education problematizes the notion of colonial governmentality as the only site for identity 
dissemination.  
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan & the Passive Revolution of Modernization 
 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was at the forefront of a section of the Muslim elite who argued in 
tandem with the colonial government for an increase in Muslim education. As the secretary for 
the Select Committee for Better Diffusion and Advancement of Learning among Muhammadans 
of India, he published the findings and conclusions of his organization in 1872. The report 
contained both the opinions of the organization, as well as findings extracted from essays 
submitted to a contest that asked participants to opine on the state of education in Muslim 
communities. The report noted that, “the fact of the proportion of Muhammadans reading in 
Government Colleges and Schools being less than that of Hindoos is indisputable.”
17
 When 
describing the rationale behind this phenomenon, the committee noted that the majority of 
essayists remarked that fear of losing one‟s religion was one reason for not attending: “the 
students of Government Institutions learn to look on their religion with discredit . . . Syed Ahmed 
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Khan Bahadur remarked on this point that, he had never met a man who knew English and who 
had still full respect for all the religious beliefs.”
18
 The report further located causes of poor 
attendance in: corruption of morals in the schools, the British serving as the administrators of 
education, mixing of noble and poor children in the classroom, the medium of the English 
language, the overall poverty of Muslims, and a want of religious education.
19
 They finally 
concluded that the Muslim community should “look forward to, and inaugurate an educational 
system for future generations” which could take in account the fact that Muslims compose “a 
very large community” with “different classes composing that community.” The Committee 
attempted to advise the establishment of a system of education that could account for “the 
various wants and requirements of those different classes of the people.”
20
 
 Sir Syed would use many of the recommendations laid out by the Select Committee when 
establishing the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College Fund Committee. Indeed, this new 
committee stated in its constitution that, “the object of the Committee shall be to collect funds 
towards the establishment of a college, particularly one for the education of the Muhammadans 




When writing a letter to Sir William Muir on the proposed establishment of the MAOC, 
he wrote that his goals in establishing the college were to: 
 Set to work to gather together the means whereby the obstacles which beset our people 
 might be done away and an end might be brought to their barbarism and aversion from 
 the acquirement of the modern sciences and useful languages, by which a man rises from 
 the nadir of worthlessness to the zenith of knowledge.
22
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 These sentiments would be repeated in a letter to the Viceroy Edward Robert Lytton, 
wherein he wrote that, “the social conditions of our community – the traditions of the past, to 
which time has lent a charm, no less vague than prejudicial – the religious feelings inculcated 
with our earliest infancy – have been, and still are, obstacles to a thorough appreciation of 
English education.”
23
 In a letter to Sir John Strachey, finance minister within the Governor-
General's Council, Sir Syed expressed the opinion that: 
You, Sir, are aware that of all the races inhabiting the continent of India, and doing 
homage to the British Throne, there is none which has remained so far behind the age as 
the Musalman subjects of the Empress of India. They have withstood the influence of the 





 Sir Syed used this critical language to gather momentum for his drive towards a 
modernization of the Muslim community in order to recreate a politically influential Muslim 
elite.
25
 This idea of modernization operated within an intellectual paradigm that at its core sought 
to reconcile the theological underpinnings of Islam with those of the modern sciences in order to 
educate a younger generation whom he hoped would populate this nascent elite community. In 
order to accomplish this, his quest hinged upon loyalism to the British Crown in that the 
government would take on a paternalistic role within the Muslim community in order to further 
modern education.
26
 His ideal, which later came into fruition with the establishment of the 
MAOC in 1875, was to use the Raj in order to found a college that would cater to the needs of a 
nascent educated elite; this college would be modeled off of Cambridge University and would 
blend the ideas of liberalization, humanism, the sciences, and pragmatic politics with a 
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theological education founded upon both Sunni and Shi'a principles  (hence the term “Anglo-
Oriental” with the title of the college).
27
 Lurking underneath his critiques of the Indian Muslim 
community was a strong desire for modernization and change. However, it must be considered 
whether a process of modernization had an ability to disseminate an identity. 
 Antonio Gramsci's theory on passive revolutions provides a framework to understand this 
process. In his “Notes on Italian History,” Gramsci compared the period of the Italian 





 centuries wherein the bourgeois rose to power (1789, 1831, and 1848). While 
both situations led to a rise of a national(ist) bourgeoisie, the French and Italian revolutions 
differed in that whereas the French utilized large-scale political uprising, the Italians achieved 
unification through small changes – a passive revolution. Within the scope of this comparison, 
Gramsci concluded that a passive revolution was deployed by the bourgeoisie precisely when it 
was impossible to conduct a large scale upheaval. Instead, revolution was carried out in “small 
doses, legally, in a reformist manner.” Through this method of deployment, the bourgeoisie could 
“preserve the political and economic position of the old feudal classes, to avoid agrarian reform, 
and especially, to avoid the popular masses going through a period of political experience such as 
occurred in France in the years of Jacobinism, in 1831, and in 1848.”
28
  
Partha Chatterjee expounded on the notion of passive revolution within an anticolonial 
nationalist setting. In this reformulation, he concluded that the anticolonial nationalist sought to 
form an independent nation-state, which in turn was predicated upon the formation of a national 
movement with support from other dominant classes, as well as the support of the subordinate 
classes. This, he concluded, was a “reorganization of the political order.” However, this process 
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was a moderated one: 
 It does not attempt to break up or transform in any radical way the institutional structures 
 of 'rational' authority set up in the period of colonial rule, whether in the domain of 
 administration and law or in the realm of economic institutions or in the structure of 
 education, scientific research and cultural organization . . . it also does not undertake a 




 Anticolonial nationalist movements relied on the notion of passive revolution: as a 
bourgeois movement, it sought to establish a position of power, but it did not accomplish this 
through a process of violent political upheaval. Instead, it relied on a principle of small changes 
in the preexisting political system. Chatterjee expands this principle to Sir Syed himself, noting 
that, “Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who launched a movement in the late 19th century to popularize 
education among Indian Muslims, was not a 'reactionary' because without this education, 
Muslims would have remained backward.”
30
 Reactionary here refers to the idea that Sir Syed 
was not a communal leader obstructing the political process; instead he sought to modernize 
(bring forward) Muslims in order to create a politically viable bourgeoisie.
31
 
 The connection between Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the colonial state should now be 
evidently clear. The process of Islamic modernization through education can now be seen as a 
form of passive revolution. Sir Syed did not seek to institute a political process whereby politics 
as usual would be overthrown. Instead, he utilized a reformist technique: by advocating for the 
state to take a position of paternalism within the current political system, a Muslim bourgeoisie 
could be created. However, this does not yet address the issue of the language utilized within this 
quest for modernization. Why did Sir Syed continue to use language similar to the colonial state 
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when describing the state of education amongst Muslims? To put it simply, the language of the 
passive revolution was not in itself revolutionary: it played by the rules set out in front of it. But 
once again, the concept of the passive revolution is not enough in itself to fully account for the 
presence of this trope. The full picture must be considered: that of the state and the elite, coming 
together in forming a dominant discourse. 
Dominant Discourse 
 It may be fruitful to discuss the concept of discourse before a discussion on the dominant 
discourse of “uneducated-ness” can begin. Discourse in this sense is derived from the works of 
Foucault. For him, discourse is that which makes a speech act meaningful; the relational aspect 
between speech and meaning(s) is what comprises a basic notion of discourse.
32
 Meaning here is 
expansive: it does not only relate to what is being signified, but can also refer to the position of 
the speech act (i.e., where and when the speech act may be produced to provide meaning).  
 However, what is inherent in the production and formulation of any discourse is an 
intimate connection between knowledge and power. That is to say that knowledge is produced 
through power and the exercising of any form of power is connected to the production of 
knowledge.
33
 Though this logic may seem circular, it relies on a key principle of exclusion. 
Knowledge is created through and from positions of power. Because it comes from a position of 
power, the formulation of discourse is exclusionary in what may be spoken, where it may be 
spoken, and how it may be spoken. The creation of knowledge is linked to a position of power 
wherein all exercises of power are based upon making use of knowledge, which can then be 
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 A dominant discourse is a discourse that is intimately connected to the field of power; 
through this power, it becomes the only relation towards meaning. An example of a dominant 
discourse can be located in the production of a discourse on sexuality wherein the dominant 
discourse was that of heterosexual, conjugal, reproductive pair.
35
 
 To return to the trope of the uneducated Muslim, one can locate the creation of a 
dominant discourse of being uneducated. It was a nexus of power between the state and Muslim 
elite that was involved in the creation and dissemination of the trope of the uneducated Muslim. 
It cannot be denied that this trope began with the state: it started with the demarcation of subjects 
into discrete identities through ethnographic practices (the use of perfect religious neutrality to 
see Muslim as an entity). Through the process, the subject then became modified (uneducated). 
The entirety of this was linked to governmentality: the state was then able to determine the fact 
that the subject was uneducated because he did not partake of the (however transient) liberties 
bestowed upon him by the colonial state.  
 Simultaneously, there existed the implementation of the passive revolution of Islamic 
modernization. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's passive revolution was predicated upon a patronage of 
the state to create a system of modern education: it used the language as articulated by the state 
within the archive to put forth the idea that Muslims were uneducated in order to create a niche 
within the colonial state. This is to say that in order to convince the state to patronize Sir Syed‟s 
plan for higher education (thus leading to the creation of a Muslim bourgeoisie), he utilized the 
trope of the uneducated Muslim to position himself as the leader of this revolution. As previously 
stated, this trope began with the state, but then was propagated through the language of the elite. 
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What is seen were two simultaneous processes: the colonial state spoke for the Muslim, while the 
Muslim elite used the language of the state in order to also speak for the Muslim. This, in turn, 
satisfies a precondition for a moment of subalternity for the Muslim population. 
 Dominant discourses can consign groups to the fringe and in the process create moments 
of subalternity for these groups.
36
 The production of the trope of the uneducated Muslim was 
created by positions of power in the colonial state and the Muslim elite. Herein lies the ability for 
this trope to be disseminated: it did not rely on the ability for the Muslim to speak for him or 
herself. Instead, it was a process of being spoken for. The trope can remain persistent as it is not 
those who are spoken for who speak for themselves. Instead, it is the record of knowledge that 
speaks: the historical record confined Muslims to the trope of being uneducated. The state and 
elite spoke and were recorded in the archive, allowing for the conceptualization of the 
uneducated Muslim to disseminate.  
 Confining the trope of the uneducated Muslim to the theoretical space of a dominant 
discourse should not serve to lessen the paramountcy of its existence. It must be recalled that, 
according to the 1881 census, there were 50,121,585 Muslims residing in the British Raj. Only a 
handful of these were amongst the Muslim elite and the rest were consigned to a position of 
speechlessness; they were the uneducated Muslims. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has reexamined the archival material presented in the preceding chapter 
regarding the rise of Muslim education. In the process of this reexamination, it has been 
discovered that Muslims were often relegated to a trope of being uneducated. Uneducated in this 
instance refers to a prevailing notion that Muslims did not attend government-aided schools due 
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to a religious and cultural rationale. However, it was not only the state that put forward these 
ideas. In the process of Islamic modernization, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was at the forefront of a 
passive revolution and as such used similar language to reform education within Muslim 
communities. The combination of state and elite disseminating the same trope resulted in the 
formation of a dominant discourse of the uneducated Muslim, thereby consigning a large 
population to a moment of subalternity in which they were spoken for. Because the archive is a 
space that prizes the utterances of the state and the elite over the masses, the large majority of 













The Cycle of History 
 
 
Hegel says somewhere that all great historic 
facts and personages recur twice. He forgot 
to add: “Once as tragedy, and again as farce.” 





 On March 9
th
, 2005, the office of the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh requested 
that a High Level Committee be formed to investigate “relevant issues relating to the social, 
economic and educational status of the Muslim community.”
2
 On November 30
th
, 2006, the 
report was completed and made available. Officially titled the Social, Economic and Educational 
Status of the Muslim Community of India: A Report, the tract has been referred to in common 
parlance as the Sachar Report after its chairperson, the former Chief Justice of the High Court, 
Rajinder Sachar. The 425 page report analyzed the greater Muslim community of India in terms 
of population size, health, education, employment, bank credit, access to social and physical 
infrastructure, poverty, standards of living, government employment, and affirmative action. The 
report concluded with recommendations and suggestions by the committee on how the state 
could address these inequalities within the Muslim population as a whole.  
 Of particular interest to the scope of this thesis is chapter four of the report. Titled 
“Educational Conditions of Muslims,” the chapter opens with what should be familiar language 
at this point: “Muslims are at a double disadvantage with low quality education; their deprivation 
increases manifold as the level of education rises. In some instance the relative share for 
Muslims is lower than even the SCs [Scheduled Castes] who are victims of a long standing caste 
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 Recall the Hunter Education Commission, which surmised that, “'the endeavor to 
impart a high order of English Education' to the Muhammadan community had completely failed 




This is not to conclude that the two reports should be seen as equals; the similarity in 
language does however suggest the longevity of the process of the state in making an incursion 
into a minority group and asking fundamental questions regarding assimilation. In both the 
colonial and post-colonial setting, there exists an interpellative aspect to the formation of these 
commissions: the state utilizes these bodies to make subjects out of those consigned to the 
fringes of civil society. This relational aspect between subject and state is static in that the same 
fundamental questions were asked in both 1883 and 2006: why are Muslims not utilizing the 
educational apparatus and what can be done to alleviate this situation? This is not to say that the 
underlying desire to ask these questions has remained static – this, for now, remains a 
problematic yet to be dealt with. Hegel famously remarked that “the owl of Minerva spreads its 
wings only with the falling of the dusk.”
5
 The analysis of history can only be conducted after the 
passage of time; the 153 years that have passed since the conclusion of the 1857 Rebellion have 
allowed for the distance required in the study of history. When compared to the mere six years 
since the publication of the Sachar Report, one may find himself in the mid-day sun, with 
Minerva's owl nowhere to be found. However, this should not act as an impediment to ask 
certain questions; namely, to see how the cycle of history continues to the present.  
 Take for example the conclusions that the Sachar Report reaches near the end of the 
chapter. It is stated that: 
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 With regard to school education, the condition of Muslims is one of grave concern. The 
 data clearly indicates that while the overall levels of education in India, measured through 
 various indicators, is still below universal acceptable standards, the educational status of 
 the Muslim community in particular is a matter of great concern . . . For example, both 
 the Mean Years of Schooling (MYS) and attendance levels of Muslims are low in 
 absolute terms and in contracts to all SRCs [Socio-religious Communities] except in 
 some cases SCs/STs [Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes]. In fact, in several context 




 These deductions are similar to those drawn by colonial-era Education commissions. First 
and foremost, the report noted that levels of Muslim education are low – a fact of enrollment that 
seems to have remained unchanged since the 19
th
 century. Secondly, this conclusion was drawn 
in part from a comparison to the educational level of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. A 
similar juxtaposition was made in the Hunter Education Commission wherein the section on 
“Aboriginal Tribes” immediately followed the recommendations laid out for Muslim education. 
What is seen here is a historically continuous comparison and grouping of minority populations. 
This is to say that the structural disadvantages of one ethno-religious or ethno-social group are 
almost always seen in comparison with another.  
 However, most interesting is the Report's attempt to “dispel certain misconceptions and 
stereotypes with respect to education of Muslims.”
7
 The Report notes that: 
 Muslim parents are not averse to modern or mainstream education and to sending their 
 children to the affordable Government schools. They do not necessarily prefer to send 
 children to Madarsas [sic]. Regular school education that is available to any other child in 
 India is preferred by Muslims also . . . The access to government schools for Muslim 




 The attempt to dispel this “stereotype” was only undertaken after “recent trends in 
enrollments and other education attainments and Committee's interactions with the Muslim 
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 This attempt to change popular opinion occurred 130 years after the 
trope of the uneducated Muslim gained currency. It has taken nearly a century and a half for the 
state to make an attempt to reexamine the uneducated Muslim. By the mere fact that there is even 
an attempt to discuss this topic highlights an underlying reality that this trope has become 
widespread in cultural usage. It has acted as the boomerang of history: what the colonial state 
began made its way through the socio-political landscape of India and has arrived back in the 
hands of the (post-)colonial state. However, even though the state is attempting to reconsider the 
status of the uneducated Muslim in this instance, this fact should be tempered by the reality of 
later policy decisions. In 2008, the Government of India launched the Scheme for Providing 
Quality Education in Madarasa (SPQEM). This policy initiative made it clear that it “commits 
itself to provide all possible means for the uplift of the educationally backwards minorities.”
10
 
However, in light of the Sachar Report, the next sentence is particularly informative: “The 
children of the educationally backward Muslim minorities attend Maktabs/Madrassas/Darul-
Ulooms with very little participation in the national mainstream education system.”
11
 It is the 
objective of the SPQEM to “encourage traditional institutions like Madarasas and Maktabs by 
giving financial assistance to introduce science, mathematics, social studies, Hindi and English 
in their curriculum so that academic proficiency for classes I-XII is attainable for children 
studying in these institutions.”
12
 
 It took 130 years for the state to reconsider the status of the uneducated Muslim. Within 
two years of the publication of the Sachar Report, educational policy was again being formulated 
                                                 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Higher Education, “Central 
Sponcered [sic] Scheme for Providing Quality Education in Madarasa (SPQEM)” (Government of India: 2008), 
1.  
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Ibid., 2.  
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through the same assumptions that have formulated this concept since its inception in the 1870s. 
However, it must be noted that while the colonial state viewed the project of resocializing 
Muslims as a function of their inherent fanaticism, the post-colonial state sees a threat of 
fanaticism if Muslims attend madrasas. Nevertheless, in both scenarios the state seems to be 
asserting its power to prevent a rise of fanatic Muslims.  
This thesis began with an exploration of that trope in asking why there existed a push for 
Muslim education. It was found that colonial educational policies, characterized by a paranoia of 
governance stemming from the 1857 Rebellion as well as ethnographic incursions into the 
populace served to divide subjects into predefined categories, was at the center of such decisions. 
However, it was the second part of this thesis – the exploration of the origins of the development 
of the uneducated Muslim – that seems to be most persistent. This trope, developed through 
processes of ethnography, governmentality, and the passive revolution of Islamic modernization 
began to take hold in the 1870s. Its proliferation seems to have never stopped.  
 Although Marx wrote that history repeats itself both as tragedy and farce, history has not 
been given a chance to repeat in this instance. Instead, what is seen is a single cycle of history 
that has grown more problematic with the passage of time. Beginning with ethnographic 
practices and a call for modernization, it has since expanded into the quotidian world of 
stereotypes. Like its colonial antecedent, it once again is the driving force behind state policy. 
But, it cannot be said that this cycle has ended or paused even for the briefest of moments to 
allow it to be captured and repeated once again as farce. Indeed, this is history as both tragedy 
and as farce. It exists as tragedy in that in everyday life – both in the present and in the past – the 
uneducated Muslim is not simply a trope that exists in quotation marks: it is a lived reality of a 
minority population. It is farcical in that, even in the post-colonial epoch, one does not see the 
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structures and language of the Raj erased by an era of self-determination. Though one can argue 
that the torpidity of state institutions carry within them an inerasable largesse of colonialism, it 
should never be forgotten that the cycles of history, once started, continue to the present. Muslim 
education is not simply a “moment” of colonial history; instead, it is – one of many – examples 
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